Local Admin Password Maintainer

by Ryan 18. February 2015 17:02

Active Directory is great for robust, centralized management of a large amount of I.T. assets.  But even once you have Active Directory, you're still left with that problem of what to do with local administrator accounts on all of the domain members.  You probably don't want to disable the local admin account, because you'll need it in case the computer is ever in a situation where it can't contact a domain controller.  But you don't have a good way of updating and maintaining the local Administrator password across your entire environment, either.  Everyone knows better than to use Group Policy Preferences to update the local administrator password on domain members, as it is completely unsecure.  Most other solutions involve sending the administrator passwords across the network in clear-text, require an admin to manually run some scripts or software every time that may not work well in complicated networks, and they still leave you with the same local administrator password on every machine... so if an attacker knocks over any one computer in your entire domain, he or she now has access to everything.

This is the situation Local Admin Password Maintainer seeks to alleviate.  LAPM easily integrates into your Active Directory domain and fully automates the creation of random local administrator passwords on every domain member.  The updated password is then transmitted securely to a domain controller and stored in Active Directory.  Only users who have been given the appropriate permissions (Domain Administrators and Account Operators, by default) may view any password.

The solution is comprised of two files: Install.ps1, which is the one-time install script, and LAPM.exe, an agent that will periodically (e.g., once a month,) execute on all domain members.  Please note that these two files will always be digitally signed by me.

Minimum Requirements

  • Active Directory. You need to be a member of both Domain Admins and Schema Admins to perform the install. You must perform the installation on the forest schema master.
  • Forest and domain functional levels of 2008 or better. This software relies on a feature of Active Directory (confidential attributes) that doesn't technically require any certain forest or domain functional level, but enforcing this requirement is an easy way of ensuring that all domain controllers in your forest are running a modern version of Windows.
  • I do not plan on doing any testing of either the install or the agent on Windows XP or Server 2003.  I could hypothetically make this work on XP/2003 SP1, but I don't want to.  If you're still using those operating systems, you aren't that concerned with security anyway.
  • A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI,) such as Active Directory Certificate Services, or otherwise have SSL certificates installed on your domain controllers that enable LDAP over SSL on port 636.  This is because LAPM does not allow transmission of data over the network in an unsecure manner.  It is possible to just bang out some self-signed certificates on your domain controllers, and then distribute those to your clients via Group Policy, but I do not recommend it.
  • The installer requires Powershell 4. Which means you need Powershell 4 on your schema master. Which means it needs to be 2008 R2 or greater.  I could port the install script to an older version of Powershell, but I haven't done it yet.
  • The Active Directory Powershell module. This should already be present if you've met the requirements thus far.
  • The Active Directory Web Service should be running on your DCs. This should already be present if you've met the requirements thus far.
  • LAPM.exe (the "agent") will run on anything Windows Vista/Server 2008 or better, 32 or 64 bit.  I just don't feel like porting it back to XP/2003 yet.

COPYRIGHT AND DISCLAIMER NOTICE:

Copyright ©2015 Joseph Ryan Ries. All Rights Reserved.

IN NO EVENT SHALL JOSEPH RYAN RIES (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS 'THE AUTHOR') BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOST PROFITS, ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE AND/OR ITS DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF THE AUTHOR IS ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

THE AUTHOR SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
THE SOFTWARE AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTATION, IF ANY, PROVIDED HEREUNDER IS PROVIDED "AS IS". THE AUTHOR HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, UPDATES, ENHANCEMENTS, OR MODIFICATIONS.


Installation Instructions

  • Download the installation package found below, and unzip it anywhere on your Active Directory domain controller that holds the Schema Master FSMO role.  (Use the netdom query fsmo command if you forgot which DC is your Schema Master.)
  • If necessary, use the Unblock-File Powershell cmdlet or use the GUI to unblock the downloaded zip file.
  • You can verify the integrity of the downloaded files like so:


  • If you need to change your Powershell execution policy in order to run scripts on your DC, do so now with Set-ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned.
  • Execute the Install script by typing .\Install.ps1 in the same directory as the script and LAPM.exe.

  • The installation script will perform several prerequisite checks to ensure your Active Directory forest and environment meet the criteria. It will also create a log file that stores a record of everything that takes place during this install session.  If you see any red [ERROR] text, read the error message and try to correct the problem that is preventing the install script from continuing, then try again. (E.g. SSL certificate not trusted, you're not on the Schema Master, etc.)  It's important that you read and consider the warning text, especially the part about how extending the Active Directory schema is a permanent operation.
  • Type yes at the warning prompt to commit to the installation.

  • The installation will now make a small schema modification by adding the LAPMLocalAdminPassword attribute to the Active Directory schema, adding that attribute to the computer object, and then adding an access control entry (ACE) to the root of the domain that allows the SELF principal the ability to write to that attribute.  That means that a computer has the right to modify its own LAPMLocalAdminPassword attribute, but not the attribute of another computer. (A computer does not have the ability to read its own LAPMLocalAdminPassword attribute. It is write-only.)

  • Finally, the install script copies LAPM.exe to the domain's SYSVOL share. This is so all domain members will be able to access it.
  • You are now done with the script and are in the post-installation phase.  You have one small thing left to do.
  • Open Group Policy Management on your domain controller.

  • Create a new GPO and link it to the domain:

  • Name the new GPO Local Admin Password Maintainer.
  • Right click on the new GPO and choose Edit. This will open the GPO editor.
  • Navigate to Computer Configuration > Preferences > Control Panel Settings > Scheduled Tasks.

  • Right-click in the empty area and choose New > Scheduled Task (At least Windows 7).

  • Choose these settings for the new scheduled task. It is very important that the scheduled task be run as NT Authority\System, also known as Local System.


  • This task will be triggered on the first of every month.  It's advisable to configure the random delay shown in the screenshot above, as this will mitigate the flood of new password uploads to your domain controllers on the first of the month.

  • For the program to execute, point to \\YourDomain\SYSVOL\YourDomain\LAPM.exe. Remember that the second "YourDomain" in the path is a reparse point/symlink that looks like "domain" if you view it in File Explorer.  For the optional argument, type BEGIN_MAGIC, in all capital letters.  It is case sensitive.
  • Lastly, the "Remove this item when it is no longer applied" setting is useful.  Unchecking "allow this task to be run on demand" can also be useful.  As an administrator, you have some leeway here to do what makes the most sense for your environment.  You might even choose to scope this GPO to only a certain OU if you only want a subset of the members of your domain to participate in Local Admin Account Maintainer.

  • Click OK to confirm, and you should now have a new scheduled task that will execute on all domain members.
  • Close the Group Policy editor.

Don't worry if the scheduled task also applies to domain controllers.  LAPM.exe detects whether it is running on a domain controller before it does anything, and exits if it is.


It also doesn't matter what the local administrator's name is, in case the account has been renamed. LAPM uses the SID.

LAPM logs successes and failures to the Windows Application event log.  Here is an example of what you might see if a client can't connect to a DC for some reason, like if SSL certificates aren't configured correctly:

In an event like this, LAPM.exe exits before changing the local administrator password, so the password will just stay what it was until the next time the scheduled job runs.

LAPM will generate a random, 16-character long password.  The "randomness" comes from the cryptographically secure PRNG supplied by the Windows API.

Success looks like this:


Now, notice that the standard domain user "Smacky the Frog" is unable to read the LAPMLocalAdminPassword attribute from Active Directory:

However, a Domain Administrator or Account Operator can!

Of course, you can also see it in the GUI as well, with Active Directory Users and Computers with advanced view turned on, for example.

So there you have it. Be smart, test it out in a lab first, and then enjoy your 30-day, random rotating local admin passwords!

As I continue to update this software package, new versions will be published on this page.

Download:

LAPM-1.0.zip (54.4KB)


One Way of Exporting Nicer CSVs with Powershell

by Ryan 16. December 2014 11:12

One of the ever-present conundrums in working with computers is that data that looks good and easily readable to a human, and data that is easy and efficient for a computer to process, are never the same.

In Powershell, you see this "immutable rule" manifest itself in that, despite all the various Format-* cmdlets available to you, some data will just never look good in the console.  And if it looks good in the console, chances are you've mangled the objects so that they've become useless for further processing over the pipeline.  This is essentially one of the Powershell "Gotcha's" espoused by Don Jones, a term that he refers to as "Format Right."  The principal is that if you are going to format your Powershell output with a Format-* cmdlet, you should always do so at the end of the statement (e.g., on the right side.)  The formatting should be the last thing you do in an expression, and you should never try to pass something that has been formatted over the pipeline.

CSV files, in my opinion, are a kind of happy medium, because they are somewhat easy for humans to read (especially if the human has an application like Microsoft Excel or some such,) and CSV files are also relatively easy for computers to read and process.  Therefore, CSVs are a popular format for transporting data and feeding it to computers, while still being legible to humans.

When you use Export-Csv to write a bunch of objects out to a CSV file:

# Get Active Directory groups, their members, and memberships:
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -SearchBase 'CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -Properties Members,MemberOf | `
    Select Name, Members, MemberOf | `
    Export-Csv -NoTypeInformation -Path C:\Users\ryan\Desktop\test.csv 

And those objects contain arrays or lists as properties, you'll get something like this in your CSV file:

"Name","Members","MemberOf"
"MyGroup","Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.ADPropertyValueCollection","Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.ADPropertyValueCollection"

Uh... that is not useful at all.  What's happened is that instead of outputting the contents of the Active Directory group members and memberOf attributes, which are collections/arrays, Powershell has instead output only the names of the .NET types of those collections.

What we need is a way to expand those lists so that they'll go nicely into a CSV file.  So I usually do something like the script excerpt below.  This is just one possible way of doing it; I by no means claim that it's the best way or the only way.

#Get all the AD groups:
$Groups = Get-ADGroup -Filter * -SearchBase 'OU=MyOU,DC=domain,DC=com' -Properties Members,MemberOf

#Create/initialize an empty collection that will contain a collection of objects:
$CSVReadyGroups = @()

#Iterate through each one of the groups:
Foreach ($Group In $Groups)
{
    #Create a new object to hold our "CSV-Ready" version of the group:
    $CSVReadyGroup = New-Object System.Object #Should probably be a PSObject
    #Add some properties to the object.
    $CSVReadyGroup | Add-Member -Type NoteProperty -Name 'Name'     -Value  $Group.Name
    $CSVReadyGroup | Add-Member -Type NoteProperty -Name 'Members'  -Value  $Null
    $CSVReadyGroup | Add-Member -Type NoteProperty -Name 'MemberOf' -Value  $Null

    # If the group has any members, then run the code inside these brackets:
    If ($Group.Members)
    {
        # Poor-man's serialization.
        # We are going to convert the array into a string, with NewLine characters 
        # separating each group member. Could also be more concise just to cast
        # as [String] and do  ($Group.Members -Join [Environment]::NewLine)

        $MembersString = $Null
        Foreach ($GroupMember In $Group.Members)
        {
            $MembersString += $GroupMember + [Environment]::NewLine
        }
        #Trim the one extra newline on the end:
        $MembersString = $MembersString.TrimEnd([Environment]::NewLine)
        #Add to our "CSV-Ready" group object:
        $CSVReadyGroup.Members = $MembersString
    }

    # If the group is a member of any other groups, 
    # then do what we just did for the Members:
    If ($Group.MemberOf)
    {
        $MemberOfString = $Null
        Foreach ($Membership In $Group.MemberOf)
        {
            $MemberOfString += $Membership + [Environment]::NewLine
        }
        $MemberOfString = $MemberOfString.TrimEnd([Environment]::NewLine)
        $CSVReadyGroup.MemberOf = $MemberOfString
    }

    #Add the object we've created to the collection:
    $CSVReadyGroups += $CSVReadyGroup
}

#Output our collection:
$CSVReadyGroups | Export-Csv -NoTypeInformation -Path C:\Users\ryan\Desktop\test.csv

Now you will have a CSV file that has readable arrays in it, that looks good when you open it with an application such as Excel.

Have You Been Pwned by CVE-2014-6324/MS14-068?

by Ryan 19. November 2014 08:11

In case you haven't heard, there is a critical [Windows implementation of] Kerberos bug that you need to be updating, right now.

More information on the vulnerability can be found here.

In the "Detection Guidance" section of the above blog post, you will see that you can detect if the vulnerability has been exploited on an unpatched machine by analyzing the Security event logs. Specifically, looking at Event ID 4624 logon events, and taking note that the "Security ID" and "Account Name" fields in that event description match.  If they don't, chances are high that you have been a victim of a privilege escalation attack.

I whipped up a detection script to check all the domain controllers:

#Requires -Module ActiveDirectory
Set-StrictMode -Version Latest
Get-Job | Remove-Job -Force
[String]$DomainName = $(Get-ADDomain).Name
$DCs = $(Get-ADDomain).ReplicaDirectoryServers

:NextDC Foreach ($DC In $DCs)
{
    Start-Job -ScriptBlock {
        Param($DC)
        [Int]$PotentialMS14068s = 0
        Write-Output "Fetching Security event log from $DC."
        Try
        {
            $Events = Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4624 -ComputerName $DC -ErrorAction Stop
        }
        Catch
        {
            Write-Error "An error occurred while reading event log from $DC.`r`n$($_.Exception.Message)"
        }

        :NextEvent Foreach ($Event In $Events)
        {            
            $MessageLines  = $Event.Message -Split [Environment]::NewLine
            
            [String]$SecurityID    = [String]::Empty
            [String]$AccountName   = [String]::Empty
            [String]$AccountDomain = [String]::Empty

            # Server 2012 Format
            If ($MessageLines[13].Trim() -Like 'Security ID:*')
            {
                $SecurityID    = ($MessageLines[13].Trim() -Split ':')[1].Trim()
                $AccountName   = ($MessageLines[14].Trim() -Split ':')[1].Trim()
                $AccountDomain = ($MessageLines[15].Trim() -Split ':')[1].Trim() 
            }
            
            # Server 2008 R2 Format
            If ($MessageLines[11].Trim() -Like 'Security ID:*')
            {
                $SecurityID    = ($MessageLines[11].Trim() -Split ':')[1].Trim()
                $AccountName   = ($MessageLines[12].Trim() -Split ':')[1].Trim()
                $AccountDomain = ($MessageLines[13].Trim() -Split ':')[1].Trim()
            }

            If (($SecurityID -EQ [String]::Empty) -OR ($AccountName -EQ [String]::Empty) -OR ($AccountDomain -EQ [String]::Empty))
            {
                Write-Error "Event log message format unrecognized on $DC!"
                $Event | Format-List
                Break NextEvent
            }

            If ($AccountDomain -Like $DomainName -And $SecurityID -NotLike 'S-1-5-18')
            {
                $SID = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($SecurityID)
                $Username = $SID.Translate([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount])        
                If ($Username -Like '*\*')
                {
                    $Username = ($Username -Split '\\')[-1]
                }
                If ($Username -Like '*@*')
                {
                    $Username = ($Username -Split '@')[0]
                }
                If ($Username -NE $AccountName)
                {
                    $Event | Format-List
                    $PotentialMS14068s++
                }        
            }
        }
        Write-Output "Finished with $DC. $PotentialMS14068s interesting events found."
    } -ArgumentList $DC
}

While ($(Get-Job -State Running).Count -GT 0)
{
    Get-Job -State Completed | Receive-Job   
    Start-Sleep -Seconds 10 
}

The script uses Powershell jobs to achieve some parallelism, because if you have more than one or two domain controllers in your environment, this quickly becomes a Herculean, time-consuming task.  The script will display potential security event log events that may indicate exploits currently being used in your environment.

Windows Server Technical Preview: Soft Reboot

by Ryan 16. November 2014 11:11
Windows Server Technical Preview Desktop

Microsoft's technical preview of the next version of Windows Server has been out for a month or two now.  (Go download it, what are you waiting for?)  Is it Windows Server 10?  Server 2015?  I suppose they could try to get away from naming it altogether and just call it "Windows Server," to signify that they only plan on evolving the platform incrementally from now on, rather than using the traditional punctuated equilibrium of boxed product releases that we're used to... that's for Microsoft to know and for us to find out.

 

One of the fun things about public CTP releases is that the thorough documentation always comes last... so we download these tech previews, and we see all these new features, and a lot of them are not well documented, if they're documented at all.  And that makes them great blog fodder.  So let us begin a journey through these poorly-documented features, starting with a new feature called Soft Restart.

The promise of this simple feature is to allow server administrators to restart or reboot the Windows operating system on a physical computer, without having to wait through the long and annoying process of the machine's POST, initializing RAID controllers, out-of-band management devices, network adapters, etc.  On some physical server hardware, this process can take several minutes just to come back from a reboot.

However, on a virtual machine, this feature is not likely to save you much time, however, since the virtualized/synthetic/emulated devices on VMs don't typically have those long initialization procedures anyway.

You can install the Soft Restart feature via the GUI:

Soft Restart via GUI

Or by my preferred method, Powershell:

PS C:\> Install-WindowsFeature Soft-Restart -Restart

Installing the feature requires a reboot.

So, one thing you'll notice in the new Windows Server that we did not have before, is a new parameter - /soft - for the shutdown.exe program:

shutdown.exe soft restart

However, I find it interesting that this new parameter exists, and works, with or without the new Soft Restart feature actually being installed!

There is also a new Powershell equivalent: Restart-Computer -Soft. This also appears to work regardless of whether the Soft Restart feature is actually installed or not... but this may be because I only have the tech preview on virtual machines right now.  It could be a different story if I were playing on physical hardware.

Modifying Permissions on Windows Services Pt I

by Ryan 28. October 2014 19:10

I'm going to jot down some quick notes on modifying the permissions on Windows services, because I don't think I have written anything about it here before.

Many times, we find ourselves wanting to delegate some administrative activity on a server to another admin or group of admins, but we don't want to give them full administrative control over the entire server.  We need to delegate only specific activity.  For example, we might want to give our delegated users the right to stop, start and restart only a specific Windows service.  Modifying the ACL on a Windows service is a little more involved than modifying the ACL on a file or folder, though.

You can do this with Group Policy if it's a domain-joined machine.


Group Policy System Services

If the computer is not domain joined or if you only want to do this with the local security policy of one or two computers, you can also accomplish this task using Security Templates on the local computer:


Local Security Templates

You can also use the sc.exe utility:


sc sdshow and sc sdset

The sc sdshow servicename command displays the access control list of the Windows service, in SDDL (security descriptor definition language) format.

The SDDL string looks crazy at first, but it’s pretty simple after you analyze it for a second. There is a D: part, and an S: part. The D: part stands for Discretionary ACL. This is what we usually think of when we think of an ACL on a file, etc. The S: part is the system ACL that is used for things like object access auditing, and is not usually modified as much or thought about as much as the DACL.

With the second command, I am setting the new ACL on the service with sc sdset. I have inserted one Access Control Entry into the D: part of the ACL, before the S: part. The SID I specified is of a non-administrative user. I would recommend creating a security group called “IIS Delegated Administrators” or something like that, and using the SID of that security group. I have granted that account the RP, WP, and DT privileges. (Start service, stop service, and pause service.)  The A stands for Allow, as opposed to a Deny ACE.  And different types of objects such as services, files, MSDTC components, etc., all have slightly different rights strings.  In other words, the "RP" right means something different for a Directory Service object than it does for a Windows service.  Here are the rights strings for Windows services:

CC      SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG

DC      SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG

LC      SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS

SW      SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS

RP      SERVICE_START

WP      SERVICE_STOP

DT      SERVICE_PAUSE_CONTINUE

LO      SERVICE_INTERROGATE

CR      SERVICE_USER_DEFINED_CONTROL

SD      _DELETE

RC      READ_CONTROL

WD      WRITE_DAC

WO      WRITE_OWNER

You can find a lot more here.

About Me

Ryan Ries
Texas, USA
Systems Engineer
ryan@myotherpcisacloud.com

I am a systems engineer with a focus on Microsoft tech, but I can run with pretty much any system that uses electricity.  I'm all about getting closer to the cutting edge of technology while using the right tool for the job.

This blog is about exploring IT and documenting the journey.


Blog Posts (or Vids) You Must Read (or See):

Pushing the Limits of Windows by Mark Russinovich
Mysteries of Windows Memory Management by Mark Russinovich
Accelerating Your IT Career by Ned Pyle
Post-Graduate AD Studies by Ned Pyle
MCM: Active Directory Series by PFE Platforms Team
Encodings And Character Sets by David C. Zentgraf
Active Directory Maximum Limits by Microsoft
How Kerberos Works in AD by Microsoft
How Active Directory Replication Topology Works by Microsoft
Hardcore Debugging by Andrew Richards
The NIST Definition of Cloud by NIST



MCITP: Enterprise Administrator

VCP5-DCV

Profile for Ryan Ries at Server Fault, Q&A for system administrators

LOPSA

GitHub: github.com/ryanries

 

I do not discuss my employers on this blog and all opinions expressed are mine and do not reflect the opinions of my employers.